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OCTOBER TERM, 1967 
No. 67 
JOHN w. TERRY 
v. 
STATE OF OHIO 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TllE 
BT.A.TE OF OHIO 
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES AS AMICUS CURIAE 
INTEREST OF TEE tl'NI'I'ED STATES 
Although there is no federal statute comparable to 
the so-called "stop and frisk" laws adopted in many 
States, the United States has a direct interest in the 
definition of the power of law enforcement officers to 
detain persons without formal arrest in the course 
of investigating crime. Federal agents, although they 
do not exercise the broad powers of local police, are 
not infrequently confronted with situations where 
effective law enforcement in the areas within their 
jurisdiction would require them to stop and detain 
persons for a limited period of time in order to obtain 
and verify information. Also, of course, investiga-
tions by local police frequently produce evidence of 
(1) 
2 
federal crime. The question whether such evidence was 
lawfully obtained in the first instance has obvious 
consequence for federal law enforcement. 
We are filing our brief in the Ter·ry case since its 
context is not unlikethat which is apt to characterize 
a typical federal case; that is to say, it concerns the 
general powers of law enforcement officials and does 
not turn on a specific statutory definition of police 
authority. The fundamental question, as we view it, is 
whether it is consistent with the Fourth Amendment's
guaranty of the "right of the people to be secure in 
their persons" against "unreasonable searches and 
seizures" to recognize a right of law enforcement 
officers to stop and detain a person for a limited 
period for the purpose of investigation. We urge that 
such a limited detention need not be regarded as an 
arrest, and that therefore the basis for such detention 
need not satisfy the standard of probable cause which 
would have to be met in orcler to secure a warrant of 
arrest. The Fourth Amendment guaranty against un-
reasonable searches is satisfied if the detention is 
reasonable under the circumstances, which necessarily 
must vary from situation to situation. This is not to 
argue that the Fourth Amendment is inapplicable to 
police conduct fairly described by the term, '' stop 
and frisk"; rather, it is to say that a lesser showing 
will meet the constitutional test of reasonableness in 
the case of a brief detention on the street than in the 
case of a conventional arrest. If a right of limited 
detention does exist, w.e suggest further that a law en-
forcement officer has the right to pat clown the sus-
pect's outer clothing in order to determine whether 
439 
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he possesses a weapon, assuming that this step ap-
pears reasonably necessary for the detaining Qfficer's 
self-protection. 
I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PERMITS REASONABLE ABLE 
LIMITED DETENTION FOR INVESTIGATION 
A. A DISTINCTION MAY VALIDLY DE DRAWN UNDER THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT BETWEEN ARRESTS AND LIMITED DETENTIONS FOR 
INVESTIGATION 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
stitution provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against un-
reasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation 
and particularly describing the place to 'be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
The heart of the problem is whether the limited 
"seizure" of the person involved in a brief detention 
by police for investigation is equivalent to the seizure 
under a warrant for which the Fourth Amendment 
requires probable cause. This is often phrased in terms 
of whether such seizure should be deemed an arrest. 
However mere reference to terminology does not re-
solve the issue. The term arrest-which does not 
appear in the Fourth Amendment-has different 
shades of n1eaning in differing contexts. As was said in 
United States v. Bonanno, 180 F. Supp. 71, 77 (S.D. 
N.Y.), reversed on other grounds sub nom. United 
States v. Bufalino, 285 F. 2d 408 (C.A. 2): 
In dealing with words there is always a temptation 
tion to allow them to beeome separated from 
4 
their objective correlatives in the everyday 
world, and to treat them as if they have, or 
ought to have, one single simple meaning,_ unaffected
a:ffected by the contexts in which they occur and 
divorced from the world of things and events 
which give them their content and justification. 
"Arrest" is just such a word, not only because 
it is necessarily unspecific and descriptive of 
complex, often extended processes, but because 
in different contexts it describes different proc-
esses, each of which has built up, in both legal 
and common parlance, sharply divergent emo-
tional connotations. 
An arrest under a warrant of arrest involves more 
than the mere stopping of a person on the street or in 
a car, even when the stopping is by a police officer. 
An arrest lmder a warrant is for the purpose of bring-
ing the individual "before a court, body or official or 
of otherwise securing the administration of the law." 
Perkins, The Law of Arrest, 25 Iowa L. Rev. 201 
(1940) ; Hall, Law and Government, The Law of 
Arrest, 1-4 (2d ed. 1961). In its criminal aspect, it 
is the taking of a person into custody so that ha may 
be available to answer for the commission of a crime.1 
Similarly, an arrest without a warrant for a specific 
crime is not only to restrain the individual, but to take 
him into custody to answer criminal charges. For that 
1 See 1 Varon, Searches, Seizures a.nd Immunities 59 (1961); 2
Blackstone's Commentaries 234 (1866 ed.); 1 Chitty's Criminal 
La.'v 11 (5th ed. 1847) ; Perkins, The Law of Arrest, 25 Iowa 
L. Rev. 201 (1940); Note, Detenticn, Arrest, and Salt Lake 
CityPolice Practices, 9 Utah L. Rev. 593, 598 (1965) ; LaFave, 
Arrest 4 (1965); Tiffany, Mcintyre & Rotenberg, Detection of 
Crime 9 (1967); Note, Philadelphia Police Practices and the 
Law of Arrest, 100 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1182, 1186 (1952); Ameri-
can Law Institute, Restatement, Torts 2d § 112 (1965) . 
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kind of arrest-with or without a warrant-there must 
be probable cause. 
A limited detention in the course of a police investi-
gation does not contemplate the bringing of an indi-
vidual into court to answer to specific charges. No 
warrant of a court would therefore issue for such an 
investigation. We submit that the Fourth Amend-
ment's requirement that "no Warrant shall issue, but 
upon probable cause" is not directed to this type of 
Jetention_.the reason being that such detention is 
not equivalent to a detention under a warrant. The 
Fourth Amendment does apply, to be sure, insofar as 
it guarantees the right of the people to be secure from 
unreasonable search and seizure of any kind. "The 
use of the word 'unreasonable,' in this (Fourth) 
Amendment," :Mr. Justice Black has observed, "'means, 
of course, that not all searches and seizures are pro-
hibited. Only those which are unreasonable are unlaw-
ful." Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 
865, 873 (1960) (emphasis in original). See also the 
comment of Mr. Justice Stewart in Elkins v. United 
States, 364 U.S. 206, 222. In our view, both history 
and the practicalities of current law enforcement sup-
port the conclusion that a police officer's power to de-
tain, if carefully exercised in the light of the circum-
stances, is reasonable and thus consistent with the 
Fourth Amendment. 
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B. A LIMITED POWER OF DETI:~'"TION FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT PURPOSES
POSES IIAS HISTORICAL BASIS AND STRONG JUSTIFICATION IN THE 
NEEDS OP OUR SOCIETY 
At the time the Fourth Amendment was adopted, 
the particular evil which concerned the advocates of 
6 
the Bill of Rights was the abuse represented by the 
general warrant, only recently outlawed in England by 
case law and statute. Wilkes v. Wood, Lofft 1, 93· Eng. 
Rep. 489 Common Pleas 1763); Entick v. Carrington, 
19 Howell's State Cases 1030 (K.B. 1765) ; Lasson, 
'11he History and Development of the FourthA.1nenrl-
ment 48-50 (1937). The Fourth Amendment does, of 
course, go beyond that particular evil in protecting the 
people from any unreasonable search and seizure. 
I-Iowever, there is no indication that normal law en-
forcement techniques of the period were regarded as 
within its prohibitions. We recognize that it is difficult 
to draw a sharp analogy to conditions existing at the 
ti1ne of the adoption of the Fourth Amendment; mod-
ern police departments arc a product of the 19th cen-
tury. However, in England and in the Colonies, 2 there
2 For example, the right of "watchmen" to stop and detain 
strangers at nighttime was established by statutein Massachusetts
setts as early as 1658 an continued into the 20th century. See
Massachusetts Colonial Laws1660-1672 p. 198 (1889) . As reenacted
acted in 1797, "watchmen" were charged with t.he duty to 
* * * see that all disturbances and disorders in the night
shall be prevented and suppressed; and to examine all persons
sons whom they shall see walking abroad in the nightafter
ten o'clock, and whom they have reason to suspect of any 
unlawfulintention or desig11, of the business abroad at such 
season, and whither they arc going; and in the case they 
give not reasonable satisfaction therein, then to secure, by 
imprisonment or otherwjse, all such disorderly and suspicious
picious persons, to be safely kept until morning; then to 
carry them before one of the next Justices of the Peace, to 
be examined and proceeded against according to the nature 
of their offenses as is by law provided.
~ Perpetual Laws of Massachusetts 1788-1799, Ch. 82, Sec. 2, 
p. 410. 
A similar system of watchmen prevailed in colonial New
York. See Costello, History of the New York Police (1885), 
chapters 2-4. 
443 
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was a system of watchmen dating back to the Norman 
kings: The watchmen had a role akin to the peace-
keeping functions of a police department. s 
As pointed out in Warner, The Uniform, Arrest Act, 
28 Va. L. Rev. 315, 319 (1942), such watchmen were 
deemed to have the power to detain persons, at least 
at night, until they could account for their presence. 
'rhis power was recognized in Lawrence v. Hedger, 
3 Taunt. 13 (Common Pleas 1810), involving an ac-
tion for false imprisonment by an individual who had 
been walking through the streets of London at night 
when stopped by a watchman.The plaintiff was taken 
by the watchman to a watch-house where the defend-
ant, a parish officer, asked himhis name and the rea-
sonfor carrying his bnndle at night. Not satisfied 
with the replies, the defendant committed plaintiff to 
prison for the night. The court .fonucl for the defend-
defendant Canbre,J., concurring,foundthat the suspicion 
for detaining plaintiff was not groundless, and that 
"it is highly necessary that they [ watchn1en] should 
have such a power of detention * * *. We should be 
very soTry if the law were otherwise." 3 Taunt at 15. 
There is no reason to believe thnt similar authority 
was not commonly exercisedbypC'ace-keep:ing officers 
in the colonies. 
444 
With growing industrializationand urbanization in 
the 19th and 20th centuries, the idea of the mode111 
police force took hold-a force expected not only to 
solve crimes, bnt also to maintain order and to deter 
s It was uot until 1829 that the first police force was fonued 
in London. 3 Radzinowicz A History of English Criminal Law
109-112 (1948). 
8 
their commission. Younger, Stop and Frisk: Say it 
Likeit is, 58 J. Cir.L., C. & P.S. 293, 299 (1967); Note, 
The Law of Arrest: Constitutionality of Detention, 
and Frisk Acts, 59 N.,V. U . L. Rev. 641, 652 (1965). 
The power to conduct on-the-spot inquiry is central 
to the performance of the protective role. As the New 
York Court of Appeals said in People v. Rivera, 14 
N.Y. 2d 441, 201 N.E. 2d. :32, 34; 252 N.Y.S. 2d 458, 
461: "Prompt inquiry into suspicions or unusual
streetaction is an indispensih1e police power in the 
orderly gove1·mnent of largeurban communities." 
Mr. Justice Burton, who in his early career served 
for five years as the mayor of one of our largest 
cities, stated in similar vein (concurring in Brinegar 
v. Unites States, 338 U.S. 160, 179-180): 
Government agents have duties of crime pre-
prevention and crime detection as well as the duty 
of arresting offenders caught in the commission 
of a crime or later identified us having com-
mitted a crime. The performance of the first 
duties are as important as the performance of 
the last. * * * 
The indispensability of some authority to detain 
for purposes of limited inquiry has heen universally
acknowledged by our courts including the federal 
courts, e.g., Trusty v. Oklahoma, 360 F. 2d 173, 
(C.. A. 10); Wilson v. Porter, 361 F. 2d 412 (C.A. 
D); Busby v. United States 296 F. 2d 328 (C.A. 9), 
certiorari denied, 369 U.S. 876; United States v. Vita, 
294 F. 2d 524 ( C . .A. 2), certiorari denied, 369 U.S. 
823: Trilling v. United States, 260 F. 2d 677 (C.A. 
D.C.); Lee v. UnitedStates,221 F. 2d 29 (C.A.D.C.). 
445 
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Moreover, it seems appropriate to add that the citi-
zen called upon to respond to such limited inquiry does 
not suffer the obloquy which may be associated with 
an arrest. Rather, he is performing· the ordinary civic 
duty, familiar in all organized societies, to provide in-
formation in aid of law enforcement. See Miranda, v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478. 
Henryv. United States, 361U.S. 98, is not to the con-
trary. In that case, the prosecution conceded in the 
lower courts that an arrest took place when federal 
agents stopped the car which they were pursuing. 
That concession was accepted hy this Court as the 
basis of its decision. However, as the Court observed, 
the government had made clear that it intended to 
argue in a subsequent case (Rios v. United States, 
364 U.S. 253) that arrests do not necessarily occur
each time an individual is detained. 361 U.S. at 103, 
note 7. In Rios, this Court implicitly ruled that Henry
was not a sweeping decision, eliminating all power 
on the part of police officers to detain suspects. For 
if Henry had disposed of this issue, there would have 
been no need in Rios to remand for a determination 
of the precise time that the arrest occurred. See 364 
U.S. at 262. In short, detention, as such, is not un-
reasonable. When the proper circumstances are shown, 
it may be reasonable and within the ambit of the 
Fourth Amendment. 
C. 'l'HE TEST OF THE POWER TO DETAIN MUST BE REASONABLENESS
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES 
To say that the Fourth An1endment does not, per se,
condemn a brief detention for investigation is not to
argue that the police should be at large or to denigrate 
10 
the role of the Amendment. It is to say only that the 
Fourth Amendment is not an absolute and that its 
prohibition is aimed at unreasonable searches and seiz-
seizures.The power of limited detention whichwe support 
is one which 1nust be carefully circumscribed, and it 
is the flu1ction of the courts, in keeping with their 
tradition, to confine it within proper bounds-to chart 
the course between the recognized danger of police 
abuse on the one hand and the not insignificant danger 
of police paralysis on the other. 
Many atten1pts have been 111ade to for1nulatc a 
standard governing a limited forn1 of detention. Terms 
such as "reasonable cause to investigate": "reason-
able grounds to suspect" "reasonable grounds for 
inquiry",6 "reasonable suspicion" "founded suspj-
suspicion" 8 and "circumstances suggestive of the possibility 
of violation of criminal law" have been proposed or 
4 Yow1ger, Stop and Frisk: Say it Like it is, 58 J. Cr. L., C. 
& P.S. 293 (1967); Brinegar v. United States 338 U.S. 160, 
1 79. See also United States v. Vita, 294 F. 2d 524, 533 (C.A. 
2), certiorari denied, 369 U.S. 823; Trilling v. United States, 
260 F. 2d 677, 701. 
5 Warner, The Uniform ArrestAct, 28 Va. L. Rev. 315, 321 
(1942); Note, The Law of Arrest: Constitutionalityof Deten-
Detention and Frisk Acts59 N.W.U. L. Rev. 641, G56 (1965); commonwealth
v. Lehan, 347 Mass.194, 197N.E. 2d 840, 845; United 
States v. Thomas, 250 F. Supp. 771, 784 (S.D.N.Y.). 
6 Brief for the United States p. 11, Rios v. United States, 
No. 52, O.T., 1960.
N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. 180(a) McKinney Supp. 1964); 
Leagre, The Fourth Amendment and the Law of Arrest, 
54: J. Cr. L., C. & P.S. 393, 413 (1963); Commonwealth v. 
Hicks, 209 Pa. Super. 1, 223 A. 2d 873, 876; Wendleboe v. 
Jacobson, 10 Utah 2d 344, 353 P. 2d 178, 181. 
8 Wilsonv. Porter, 361 F. 2d 412, 415 (C.A. 9). 
9 State v. Hope, 85 N.J. Super. 551, 205 A. 2d 457. See also, 
State v. Chronister, 353 P. 2d 493 (Okla..). 
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applied. Recognizing the problems encountered in 
articulating a concept that lies somewhere between 
probable cause and bare suspicion, the AmericanLaw 
!nstitnte's Draft for a l\lodel Code of Pre-Arraignment
1 procedure Section 2.02(2) (1965) has avoided 
the adoption of a specific tern1 and has proposed a 
guideline: detention by a law enforcement officer is 
proper \vhen "a person is observed in circm11stances 
which suggest that he has committed or is about to 
commit a felony or misdemeanor and such action is 
reasonablynecessary to enable the officer to determine
the lawfulness of that person's conduct * * The 
key word in the definition is "circumstances". The 
lawfulness of a detention should be considered in the 
light of .the particular circumstances as they confront
the responsihle persons immediately on the scene. One 
judge has conuuentcd that " [ s J sweeping generalities 
ought not to be indulgedin, and the focus should be 
on the facts of the particular case." United States v. 
Bonanno, 180 F. Supp. 71, 83 (S.D.N.Y.), reversed 
on other grounds sub nom.United States v. Bufalinoalino, 
285 F. 2cl 408 (C . .A. 2). Courts and commentators have 
suggested a number of factors which should be con-
sidered in deter1nining whether a detention is proper. 
They include the foil owing: 
1. 'l'he time of day.10 
10 Busby v. United States, 296 F. 2c.l 328 (C.A. 9), certiorari 
denied, 369 U.S. 876; Bell v. United States280 F. 2d 717 
(C.A.D.C.); Commonwealthv. Lehan, 347 Mass. 197,196 N.E. 2d 
840; State v.Harris,265 Minn. 260, 121 N.W. 2d 327; 1Vendle-
boe v. Jacobson, 10 Utah 2d 344, 353 P. 2d 178; Tiffany, Mc-
Intyre and Rotenberg, Detection of Crime19 (1967) ; Nicholson
v. United States, 355 F. 2d 80 ( C.A. 5), certiorari denied, 384 
U.S. 974. 
12 
2. The p lace where the suspect is observed.11 
3. The incidence of crime in the immediate 
neighborhood.12 
4. The law enforcement officer's prior know-
ledge of the suspect.13 
5. The appearance of the suspect; i.e., 
whether he resembles someone whom the police 
are seeking.14 
6. The pre-detention conduct of the suspect 
and his companions.13 
7. The experience of the law enforcement 
officer.10 
8. The seriousness of the suspected offense.11 
9. The necessity for immediate investigative 
activity.18 
See, generally, Tiffany, McIntyre and Rotenberg, Detection
of Crimech. 2 (1967) ; .Arnold v. United Sta.tes, 
382 F. 2<l 4, 7 ( C.A. 9). 
11 Statev.Freeland.255 Iowa 1334125 N.W.2d 825. 
12 Ellis v. United States, 264 F. 2d 372 (C.A.D.C.) , certiorari 
denied 359 U.S. 998: Commonwealth v. Lehan, supra, note 10; 
Statev. Chronister 35:3 P. 2d 493 (Okla); Trustyv. Oklahoma, 
360 F. 2d in (C.A. 10). 
13Commonwealth \'. Lehan. (ibid.), State . v. Chronister, 
( ibid.): Brinegar v. United Sttes, 338 U.S. 160, 170. 
Gilbert v. United States, 366 F. 2d 923 (C.A. 9), certiorari 
denied, 388 F.S. 922: Ellis v. United States, supra, note 12; 
Goldsmith v. United States, 277F. 2d 335 (C.A..D.C.), certiorari 
denied, sub nom. Carterv UnitedStates, 364 U.S. 863; Rodgers 
v. UnitedStates,362 F. :2d 358 ( C.A. 8). 
1
j Wilson v Porter 3Gl F. 2d 412, 414 (C.A. 9); United 
States, v. Katz 238 F. Supp. 689 (S.D.N.Y.); United States v. 
Thomas 250 F. Supp. 771, 775 (S.D.N.Y.); State v. Terry, 5 
Ohio App. 2d 122, 214 N.E.2d 114. 
16 State v. Terry, (ibid.); United States v. Thomas, 250 F. 
Supp. 771, 785 (S.D.N.Y.). 
17 Lee v. United States, 221 F. 2d 29, 30 (C.A.D.C.); United 
States, v. Bonannosupra, page 11. 
18 United States v. Bonanno, (ibid. ). 
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The sum total of all the suggestions brings one back 
to the terms of the Fourth Amendment itself-a pro-
protection against "unreasonable" searches and seizures. 
What is r.easonable or "unreasonable'' must necessarily 
vary with differing times and differing situations. 
Similarly, it is impossible to define with exactitude 
the permissible extent of a detention not amounting to 
an arrest. Once more, we submit, the constitutional 
standard must be one of reasonableness under the 
circumstances. When the suspected offense is not 
serious and a modicum of essential information (e.g., 
the suspect's identity and address) has been ob-
tained, so that the police would suffer little more than 
inconvenience if the citizen were permitted to go his 
way, it is reasonable to restrict the allowable period 
of the detention to very narrow limits. Conversely, 
where the person is unknown to the police, the offense 
under investigation is serious and the suspect's ex-
planation is equivocal, a detention for a somewhat 
longer (though not protracted) period would seem 
proper, at least where the questioning is on the scene.19• 
The duty imposed upon policemen by society to in-
vestigate and deter crime requires that they be allowed 
to question individuals whom they have reasonably 
stopped. Trillingv. United States, 260 F. 2d 677, 701 
(C.A.D.C.). This Court, in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
19 A discussion of the time limits stated in various statutes 
lasting from twenty minutes (Draft for a. Model Code of Pre-
Arra.ignment Procedure) to four hours (New Hampshire Laws 
Sec. 595 :2) would, for our purposes, be of no import. We agree 
with the First Circuit that a State's statutory time provision 
does not, ipso facto, crea.te a. constitutional standa.rd. Hancockv. 
Nelson, 363 F. 2d 249 (C.A.. 1). 
14 
U.S. 436, enunciated certain procedural safeguards to 
be employed"when an individual is taken into custody 
orotherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities 
ities * * * and is subjected to questioning." 384 U.S . 
.at 478. At the same time, the right of policemen to 
conduct "[g]eneral on-the-scene questioning of 
citizens'' was noted, this Court stating that responsible 
·citizenship required citizens to give whatever informa-
tion they may have to aid in law enforcement. 384 
U.S. at 477-478. It apepars, therefore, that the Court, 
in Miranda, did not consider an on-the-street detention 
based upon reasonable suspicion to constitute "custodial
dial interrogation", thereby requiring the officer to in-
form the suspect of his rights to silence and counsel 
384 U.S. at 477. See Brown v. United States, 365 F. 2d 
976, 979 (C.A.D.C.); United States v. Davis, 259 F. 
Supp. 496 (D. Mass.). Perhaps, an admonition should 
be required when the questioning beco1nes sustained 
and moves from what might be termed preliminary 
investigation to a focus on the individual as a criminal. 
We believe, however, that in the usual type of street 
investigation Miranda does not apply. We assume that 
a refusal to respond to a policeman's questions is a 
neutral act and will not establish probable cause to 
arrest where it would otherwise be lacking, United 
States v. Vita, 294 F. 2d 524, 531 (C.A. 2), certiorari 
denied, 369 U.S. 823; see United States v. Bonanno, 
supra, 180 F. Supp. at 76; cf. Perkins, The 
Law of Arrest, 25 Iowa L. Rev. 201, 259 (1940). 
"This does not, however, seem to us to require a 
451 
452 
15 
Miranda-type warning every time a policeman. asks·a 
question.20 
.. 
II. A. POLICE OFFICER can LAWFULLY "FRISK" A. SUSPECT 
THE CIRCUMSTANCES ARE SUCH THAT HE REASONABLY
SON ABLY APPREHENDS DANGER FROMA HIDDEN. WEAPON 
In keeping with our view that the question .at issue 
.. 
here is reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment, 
we think it unimportant whether a frisk. is denominated
nated a search; rather, the question is whether, even 
assUlning that it is a search, it is reasonable_. In our 
view, when a person is lawfully detained forquestioning
tioning (albeit on less than probable cause), a police 
<>fficer is warranted in patting down the outer clothing
of the suspect if the circumstances are such that he 
reasonablyapprehends that the person detained may 
have a dangerous weapon at hand .. 
In those limited circumstances, we think a frisk 
can he deemed a reasonable search under the Fourth 
.. Amendment. The invasion of privacy or interference 
with liberty is slight.21 Moreover, the detention which 
occasioned the frisk must be based on the founded 
20 Wl1ether other acts on the part of the detained suspect-
such as seeking to avoid the detention, giving obviously false 
answers, or displaying objects of potential use for criminal pur-
poses-would justify a formal arrest must necessarily be deter-
minecl in t.he context of a particularsituation. The sum total of 
the circumstances arising after the detention has occurred,when 
combined with the factors existing at the time of the detention, 
may create probable ca.use for such an arrest. Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160; Riosv. UnitedStates, 364 U.S. 253. 
21 Compare the statement in Camara v. Municipal Court, 
387 U.S. 523, 536-537, that "there can be no ready tes for 
determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need 
to search against the invasion which the search entails." 
. 
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suspicion that the individual might be, or has been,. 
involved in a serious act. The justification of the 
frisk itself is to protect theofficer acting in pursuit
of his lawful duties. In our day, when the size of a 
weapon has no relationship to the harm it can inflict, 
the need of the police for such protectionis substan-
tial, as numerous judges and commentators have rec-
ognized. State v . Moore, 187 A. 2d 807 (Del.); Commonwealth
v. Hicks, 209 Pa. Super. 1, 223 A. 2d 873; 
Leagre, The FourthAmendment and the Law of Ar-
rest, 54 J. Cr. L., C. & P.S. 393, 419 (1963) ; Warner
The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 Va. L. Rev. 315, 324 
(1942); Younger, Stop and Frisk: Say it Like it Is? 
58 J. Cr. L., C. & P.S. 293 (1967). 
Opponents of stop-and-frisk authority stress the 
possibilities of abuse. We do not minimize that danger,
although we note that this is inevitably true of almost 
all police procedures, and, perhaps, as Lord Acton 
suggested, of almost all exercises of authority hy the 
State. The reconciliation of the need for the power 
and the danger of its abuse must be found in the 
development of rules and practices which fix sensible 
limits and in the diligent supervision of the courts. 
We urge no right to search a person for contraband 
when he is detained on less than probable cause. How-
ever, when the type of frisk which we regard as law-
ful-a patting down for weapons--does reveal the existence
istence of weapons, we see no sound reason why the 
weapon so discovered may not be introduced in evidence
dence or provide the basis of a prosecution. At the 
moment the peace officer uncovers, pursuant to a frisk, 
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an item which the suspect unlawfully possesses, a 
crime is being committed in the officer's presence. It 
would be irrational to prohibit prosecution of that 
offense, merely because in the first instance the suspect 
was detained-lawfully-on less than probable cause. 
Police have the responsibility to detect crime. If the 
means of detection are not unconstitutional, there is 
no reason to construct an exclusionary rule to benefit 
the suspect who has been discovered committing a 
criminal offense in the presence of a.police officer. The 
interests of society are not adequately served merely 
by removing the dangerous weapon from the suspect's 
person and sending him on his way. 
In cases where searches and seizures have been held 
violative of the Constitution, the subject matter dis-
covered by the illegal procedure has been excluded 
from evidence in order to deter the police from resorting
ing to illegal methods. W Weeksv. United States, 232 U.S. 
3.83; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643. A similar exclusion-
exclusionaryrule would manifestly be inappropriate for items 
uncovered · by lawful frisks. On the contrary, the cus-
tomary rules of evidence should govern, and such evi-
dence, if otherwise admissible, should be received. 
Nor is there any reason to restrict the admissibility 
of evidence obtained from frisks to weapons so long 
as the frisk had a legitimate purpose and was not a 
lnere excuse to search the person on less than probable 
cause. Once more, meaningful reference can be made 
to situations involving evidence seized in a lawful 
search based upon probable cause or incident to an 
arrest. If a frisk has been properly conducted and 
f found to be legally justifiable, the mere fact that the 
18 
expectations of an officer seeking a dangerous weapon 
were not realized, and that a suspect's covered pocket 
concealed some other unlawfully possessed object, 
should not prevent the officer from removing what he 
has found. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 155; 
Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 238. 
In sum, we believe that it is consistent with the 
Fourth Amendment to recognize a power in law enforcement
forcement officers to detain and question under circumstances
cumstances amounting to less than probabe cause for a 
formal arrest, and that, in exercising such power, the 
officer may legitimately protect himself by a frisk for 
dangerous weapons. 
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